The likely consequences of the resistance capturing an Israeli soldier

By: Omar Shaban

In a preliminary evaluation of the expected consequences of the resistance's announcement of its success in capturing an Israeli soldier on the war's course and the subsequent stage, in my opinion:
• More popular support for the resistance after it realised many successes and proved high credibility in announcing those successes, in the face of the official Israeli position, which hid its losses for hours and sometimes for several days.

• An increase of the popular pressure in Israel on its government, in light of the arrival of news of the failure to realise a noticeable achievement — especially as the Israeli government did not announce the disappearance of the Israeli soldier before the issuing of the al-Qassam Brigades' statement, which places the government in a position of great questioning and doubt. The Israeli government is on the brink of collapse. The 2008 war toppled Ehud Olmert and the second in 2012 toppled Ehud Barak, and this one will topple Netanyahu and his government.

• A hardening of the Hamas movement's position in the mediation process in the face of all the parties, including the military blocs currently taking part with it. Hamas will negotiate from a position of more strength, since it has something to say. Hamas will employ the popular support for it in the negotiations process, and many regional parties will hesitate to belittle the resistance's achievements. Everyone will try to court the resistance. The saying that Hamas is responsible for the spilling of blood and the destruction will not find many buyers.

• An Israeli escalation at the level of tactics in an attempt to recover deterrence, but with a decision to stop and withdraw at the level of the operation as a whole. I think Israel has decided to stop the operation, and that is the reason that pushed Mr Kerry to come to the region, and quickly, after the cancellation of two visits that were previously scheduled. The goal is preventing further deterioration and hastening the ceasefire — especially as the terrifying pictures of the Shujaiyya massacre have spread across the whole world and stirred intense anger. The Western governments will not be able to face the anger of their peoples, who take a position contrary to the governments.

• The negotiations for the release of the newly captured soldier will not take place within the current mediation efforts, which will focus on the ceasefire. Rather that will take place within subsequent negotiations, with the goal of releasing the rest of the prisoners in what will later be known as “Shalit deal 2”.

• I think the reconciliation process in its fragile and weak picture, and its deformed newborn (the consensus government), which died in its cradle, has ended. Different conditions for the reconciliation will be examined, but after a while. The Authority will realise that its slackness in activating the consensus process was not a wise decision, and the advisors of President Mahmoud Abbas — who used to tell him that Hamas is on the verge of collapse, that it has no alternatives, and that its collapse will not take more than two weeks — will discover that they are the most stupid in the world and that they were led by their feelings and their wishes and not by their minds. They should retire so they may rest and give rest.

• A great growth of Hamas's popularity that treats the decline it suffered in the past years, as Hamas demonstrates that it is still on the path of resistance; while the popularity of the Palestinian Authority — which took a clear negative position on the Israeli war on the Gaza Strip and defined its position as very supportive of the security coordination with Israel — will retreat much.

• A tensing of the atmosphere in the West Bank, where the masses in the northern governorates will find an additional reason to go out in demonstrations to denounce the Palestinian Authority's slack position concerning the Israeli war on Gaza. Hamas's popularity will witness a noticeable rise in the West Bank and the diaspora, and it will obtain more moral and financial support.

• A strengthening of the power of Hamas's military wing, “the al-Qassam Brigades”, in the face of its political wing. The al-Qassam Brigades had the upper hand and the final word in the war's course and the mediation's course; the al-Qassam Brigades are the ones who presented the ceasefire proposals and the ones who were steering the negotiations and deciding in them. The political wing's inability to realise concrete achievements from the reconciliation process with the Fatah movement, and the modesty of the Hamas government's performance in managing Gaza for seven years, means that the al-Qassam Brigades will have the upper word even after the war's end.