Economist Shaban: this assault has hurt the Strip most — and without lifting the blockade no reconstruction will succeed

I call on Minister al-Issa to set out a detailed list of the donations and the cash and in-kind aid that was allocated to the Gaza Strip

Interviewed by: Mohammed Ghafri

Demolition, destruction, and displacement.. martyrs, wounded, and missing.. destroyed factories.. and losses in the billions — this is what the Israeli war machine has left behind as a result of its continuous aggression on the Gaza Strip since 7 July last, and what accompanies it of international silence and disregard for what is happening on the ground, save denunciation, condemnation, and disapproval.

As is the custom during and after every Israeli aggression, everyone begins speaking of the reconstruction of Gaza, and of reviving an economic life that has not revived since 2007 and will not revive so long as the Israeli blockade is imposed and the crossings do not open — and today the size of the economic losses the aggression has left behind this time is many times over what the previous wars left.
Today what is required, officially and popularly, is unifying and coordinating the efforts of work, a commitment to transparency, compelling the donor states to pay — because they are all party to the aggression — and opening the crossings and lifting the blockade are two matters that must be ended definitively.

“Al-Hadath” interviewed the Palestinian economic expert Omar Shaban on the size of the losses the Strip has suffered after this aggression, and the best ways that must be followed for reconstruction.

According to the information you have, what is the size of the economic losses resulting from the Israeli aggression? And what is the nature of these losses?

The initial indicators, before the start of the precise and scientific inventory process, issued by the Ministry of Public Works — the first body concerned with registration — say that the Strip's losses from the Israeli war reached more than 5 billion dollars, and they include the direct and indirect costs, and the costs of reconstruction.

Naturally these losses include the destroyed houses and neighbourhoods, as whole neighbourhoods were destroyed, like the Shujaiya neighbourhood and the Abasan and Khuzaa area; the number of houses destroyed reached 7 thousand completely, and more than 30 thousand houses partially, 5 thousand of these units uninhabitable — so we are speaking on average of 11 thousand residential apartments, that is, 11 thousand families that will not be able to return to their homes soon.

There are also indicators of the destruction of dozens of factories and commercial shops, especially in the border areas, where for example the Beit Hanoun industrial area was destroyed completely; the central electricity plant in Gaza was also subjected to shelling and is nearly out of service and needs a repair that may extend to a year — apart from the nearly destroyed infrastructure.
Speaking of the nature of the economic losses, we are speaking of the halt of economic life in Gaza during the war, and it is possible that this extends to coming months, given the impossibility of people, institutions, and companies returning to their work soon; on that basis, the logical direct figure may not be less than 5 billion dollars.
The Israeli occupation's targeting of the industrial and service facilities in the Gaza Strip during the aggression has as its goal destroying the infrastructure of the Palestinian economy; it has weighed heavily on the Strip economically, and will contribute to the rise of the unemployment rates above what they are.

As an economic expert from Gaza, what is the comparison between the losses the Strip suffered in each of the wars the Israeli army waged upon it?

The losses are multiplied in this war: there is a large number of the displaced to UNRWA's schools, five times the people who were forced to leave their homes in 2008.
The damages in 2008 were estimated, according to the Palestinian government at that time, at 2.5 billion dollars, and so I can say that the size of the damages that have resulted this time is not less than twice the losses that occurred in the year 2008.

As for the war of 2012, which continued 8 days, there were great damages, but not to be compared with 2008 and the current year.

After the aggression ends, what is the best way for the reconstruction and the return of economic life to the Gaza Strip?

First: the conditions of the ceasefire — will Israel lift the blockade directly and wholly, or gradually and in stages, which slows the reconstruction process.
Second: it has to do with the Palestinian political system, and the important question about the extent of the national-consensus government's capacity to continue, and the extent of the capacity of the reconciliation process that took place to succeed.
Third: it has to do with the extent of the donor community's readiness to contribute by allocating huge budgets in light of the economic crisis existing in Europe and America, and in light of the existence of other conflicts in regions to which many budgets may be allocated — and I mention here Libya, Mali, some states of Africa, Syria, Afghanistan, and Iraq.

Therefore I believe work must proceed on two levels. The first is an immediate level that began during the war and is called urgent relief — the relief that aims at meeting the basic needs of the poor and displaced population, of food, drink, and clothing, to a degree that enables them to live; these are urgent interventions that have no relation to the sustainable developmental dimension, and we call it early recovery, and it also includes treating 10 thousand wounded, improving the health services, and repairing the electricity lines.

At the same time the second level is begun, and it includes projects of a developmental dimension, working on creating job opportunities that guarantee the employment of the tens of thousands who were put out of work, and strengthening the private-work sector. Here I recommend beginning projects of removing the rubble and debris and cleaning campaigns, and restoring and repairing thousands of dunums of the lands that were destroyed in the border areas, to a degree that enables the farmers to return to their farms, and providing food to the people of the Gaza Strip — because there is a crisis in providing foodstuffs during the war, because of the farmers' inability to reach their lands.

The start of arrangements for a donors' conference to be held in Norway has been announced. I ask of the Palestinian National Authority that it pursue disclosure to a greater degree and on two levels: the first, clarifying what aid reached the National Authority and was allocated to the Gaza Strip; and the second level, clarifying how it was spent.

There are several efforts being expended at the various international and official levels in order to limit the crises the aggression has left upon the Gaza Strip, but I fear that this conference repeats the history of the Sharm el-Sheikh conference in the wake of the 2008–2009 war, where hundreds of families are still waiting to receive compensations that were earmarked for them and from which they have seen neither a dollar nor a shekel. I hope that through this conference all the problems the aggression caused in the service, industrial, and economic sectors will be solved. And this will happen only by coordinating the relief efforts and the aid to strengthen the internal front, and finding a clear mechanism to monitor and follow up all the donations earmarked for the Strip.

And I call on Minister Shawqi al-Issa, Minister of Social Affairs and head of the emergency committee supervising the aid allocated to the Gaza Strip, to set out a detailed list including all the donations and the cash and in-kind aid that was allocated to the Gaza Strip, as well as the items of expenditure, the mechanism of expenditure, and the bodies that were authorised with that — in order to strengthen transparency and trust and restore the unity of feeling, before the political, between our people in the governorates of the north and the south, and with the Palestinian Authority and its people.

You mentioned several bodies that must unite and work together — who is the body that must lead the work in the reconstruction, and have the principal role?

The Palestinian Authority is the body that must lead this question, but reconstruction operations, whether in Palestine or any region in the world, are not confined to a specific body, because no body can bear all of that; but all the efforts must be coordinated under one body, and here a national commission for managing the crisis must be formed — the Palestinian or Arab commission for reconstruction — in which there would be a representative of the Authority, the international institutions, some Palestinian bodies, and the economics experts, and the planning of the reconstruction process would be managed jointly so that we guarantee transparency and the arrival of these dues to those who need them according to priority.

It must be noted here that one people's misfortunes are another's gains; therefore it must be noted that some companies and international institutions and some representatives will find in the operations of Gaza's reconstruction a means of enrichment and of benefiting from these monies.

You published an article days ago about “institutions waiting for the war to end to practise plunder” — how should these institutions be dealt with?

I warn of the role of these international institutions that seek to obtain a large cake at the expense of the Palestinian people's suffering, as happened in the past. Many know that much of the foreign aid returns to the Israeli economy or the Western economies, through the salaries or the bonuses and the use of the luxury cars driven by the foreigners.
These institutions are dealt with, first, through creating a specialised committee, such that all the bodies working in the Gaza Strip must pass through this committee. Second, this committee must announce to the public, periodically and daily, how much aid is allocated to the reconstruction, because transparency here is important; and so the mechanism of reconstruction in Gaza must be unified centrally, without anyone's control or monopoly, in full coordination with the Palestinian Authority, which must take the reconstruction upon its shoulders — but, as we said, not alone.

What is the ideal way to gather the aid and the relief resources from the states donating to Gaza?

Regarding what the donor states present, there are three stages: the first stage is the declarations and the pledge of funding, the second stage is the allocation of this funding, and the third stage is the payment of this funding — and these amounts always diminish. For example, and not exhaustively, a certain state may announce a billion dollars, and in fact commit to half a billion, and at the time of payment pay a quarter of this amount; therefore we must not bet much on what the states declare, because not everything that is declared is always paid.

At the Sharm el-Sheikh conference after the 2008 war, 4.7 billion dollars were pledged — an amount exceeding by more than 150% the plan the Palestinian National Authority had set — but not all these amounts were honoured. Some states used pretexts for not paying their commitments, and at that time they pleaded the Palestinian division, the Palestinian Authority's lack of capacity to implement the projects in Gaza, and likewise Israel's continuation of the blockade.

As Palestinians we must pull the rug from under these pretexts, and here we must be frank, because there are some states that do not channel their monies through the Authority's fund for political reasons or corruption and the absence of competent financial management, and we must not act with emotion at that time, because the interest of the Palestinian people is the most important.

And so we form a committee or commission that compels these states to pay what they commit to, and gives a clear proof and indicator that the reconstruction process will proceed completely and 100% transparently; and we must press and use our relations with the Western and Arab states to bring more funding, so that we lighten the weight of the destruction and speed the obtaining of the aid.

For example, a website for the reconstruction process must be designed that shows daily, and at every moment, precisely where the donations and the sources of aid have gone — this increases the donor states' trust, and also many people can, through it, know how to obtain aid.

The financial crisis in Europe may prevent the Western community from contributing greatly as in the past, and I believe the Europeans will turn to the Arabs to carry out the restoration works to a great degree — we are witnessing Arab funding in the reconstruction of Syria or Iraq more than the Western funding.

In your view, will we witness a prominent Gulf role in the reconstruction process, or will the matter be confined to a Qatari role?

There will be a great desire among the Gulf states to show their solidarity with the Palestinian people. There is no doubt that Qatar will contribute and continue its support for the Gaza Strip and for the Palestinian Authority in general, in addition to the other Gulf states — Saudi Arabia approved weeks ago, for President Mahmoud Abbas, a support of half a billion riyals for the Palestinian Red Crescent and the Palestinian Ministry of Health.

Based on this economic crisis and what will result from it in the coming days, will we witness a continuation of the reconciliation?

The future of the reconciliation depends to a great degree on the extent of the Palestinian Authority's capacity to represent the Palestinian people, and to be present politically, socially, economically, and financially. In the event of the reconciliation's failure the scenarios will be difficult, because the donor community will not work in the Gaza Strip without a legitimate partner, and it considers that to be the Palestinian Authority.
The Authority and the government must be more responsible, improve their performance strategically, and share with the people — and the reconstruction process in the Gaza Strip must not be managed as a purely technical process without political dimensions.

In the previous times the Palestinian National Authority was in severe isolation from the participation of the people of the Gaza Strip, and I recall here that the Sharm el-Sheikh conference held in 2009 was attended by 90 representatives of donor bodies and states, and no one from the Gaza Strip participated in it. We are one homeland, true, but actual participation with the institutions existing in the Gaza Strip is required, whether in the process of estimating the statistics, or in representing the Palestinian plan.

It is an opportunity for the Authority to restore its standing regarding its relation with our people. We are not satisfied, but we have no alternative other than that; and so when we criticise the Authority we hope, or ask of it, that it be at its best, to spare the Palestinian people the slowness of the reconstruction process.

The Rafah crossing, the Gaza seaport, and Gaza international airport — three vital facilities being spoken of at this time. What are the scenarios you expect for each of them?

The Rafah crossing: Egypt says that the Rafah crossing is a Palestinian-Egyptian crossing and that Israel and the international community have no authority over that, and I do not expect Egypt to open the crossing completely if there is no presence of the presidential guard — this is a fundamental Egyptian demand, taking into consideration the tension of the relation with the Hamas movement.

But I hope from the brothers in Egypt that they multiply the quantities of aid entering the Gaza Strip, because the Strip needs millions of tons of raw materials — were they loaded onto trucks, we are speaking of a hundred thousand trucks entering the Gaza Strip, and this means the six crossings must open around the clock, 24 hours.

The Gaza seaport: the reconstruction process requires that there be a sea corridor, and requires that there be a transport line for the raw materials from the external states to Gaza, to guarantee the facilitation and acceleration of the reconstruction process. I do not believe Israel will object to that if there are international guarantees that guarantee security for this crossing, and we have no objection — and we have affirmed this dozens of times — that we need a sea corridor between Gaza and Europe that allows the Palestinians to move, and allows the import of the materials necessary for the reconstruction, and export, with the existence of strict security oversight, whether in the port or in the middle of the sea or on the other side of the port. The question is not difficult, and there are security solutions for all the problems.

Gaza international airport: this is a Palestinian dream, and I do not believe Israel will agree to it easily, and I hope from the political authority that it place this item on its agenda of work — this comes within the peace negotiations halted for several months.

The Rafah airport was wonderful and was a window to the world, and contributed strategically to easing people's life and strengthening the economy, and formed one of the important landmarks of sovereignty.

What do you recommend so that the economic relation between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip returns?

We must restore it in a much better form than it was previously, because the relation of economic integration is a fundamental condition for political integration. The Rafah airport can be used for our people in the West Bank as happened in the past, and the Gaza port is also important as a fundamental sea gateway for the Palestinian territories — we know that the Gaza Strip is the only Palestinian region that looks onto the sea, and so there is much the Gaza Strip presents to the Palestinian political project at the economic, political, and developmental level.

How do you view the role of Palestinian youth in the West Bank, and their carrying out many relief campaigns and fundraising for the people of the Gaza Strip?

These initiatives our youth in the West Bank carried out are natural initiatives that affirm the unity of Palestinian youth, and affirm that the Palestinian people in the homeland and the diaspora are of one heart, and affirm for the thousandth time that Palestinian youth are responsible and capable youth, and that they will not be subjected to corruption and pollution as was said.

Therefore I believe the initiatives of our brothers in the West Bank are very important initiatives — not in their material meaning, but morally more than that, and from a symbolic and political standpoint: the youth of the West Bank are with us and in solidarity with us, and they are part of the Palestinian political project.

The youth groups in Gaza and the West Bank must deepen their relation before any expected aggression, because it is difficult to work or begin activities during an emergency. And I call for forming a youth civil defence through youth groups in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, that would be always at the ready, and know what it must do in the event any region of the homeland's regions is subjected to aggression.

Source: http://www.alhadath.ps/ar_page.php?id=EomDspaNp2a2261478AN1yDY1fJBD