By Omar Shaban: The problem is not the Turkish position, but the Palestinian way of political thinking

The problem is not in the Turkish position .. but in the Palestinian way of political thinking
Omar Shaban

The reaction of some Palestinians to the return of Turkish–Israeli relations came completely consistent with the Palestinian way of political thinking for tens of years: emotional, indignant, reproachful, and lacking much rationality, sense, and maturity. It is Turkey's right, like any state in the world, to search for its interests in the way it sees suitable. History has not recorded a single case of a state that sacrificed its strategic interest for the sake of another state, whatever it may be — while history has recorded tens of examples of states that set their emotions aside to place their interests in consideration. China, India, and many of the states of Africa and Latin America and others are examples of those states. It is true that it is the duty of states to work to respect human rights, champion the wronged, and help those in need; but states' capacity and commitment to these principles varies from state to state and from time to time. It would be quite naive merely to think that a large state with a strategic vision, aspiring to be a regional power and player, would act in an emotional manner. Turkey cannot sacrifice its strategic relationship with Israel — a deep, rooted relationship, both of them allies of the United States — for the sake of Gaza. This is a natural situation: many of the Arab and Islamic states do no more than what Turkey did. It is unjust to deny that Turkey tried diligently to balance between the priorities of its championing of the Palestinian cause and its strategic relations with Israel, but it did not succeed. Therefore there is nothing to push toward shock at the Israeli–Turkish agreement: states' relations are governed by interests, not feelings.

The problem is not in the Turkish position but in the way of political thinking and the criteria on which we run our calculations. The inflated, continuous praise for years of Turkey's role harmed it more than it benefited it — as that caused the raising of people's ceiling of expectations of it, which made the fall of their dreams dreadful. The continuous and at the same time sterile attempts to portray Turkey as an innocent state acting with extreme romanticism did Turkey much wrong, because it is not so. This exaggerated praise of Turkey's role veiled from its politicians the seeing of reality and the sensing of the fields of improvement.

The Palestinian reaction to the return of Turkish–Israeli relations is not at all far from the reactions to the declarations supportive of the Palestinian position that issue from Western and Eastern states — while these states take positions consistent with their interests in the end. What happened in the Security Council and the United Nations on numerous occasions is the best proof of the great contradiction between declarations and positions.

Likewise many politicians and writers applauded, out of extreme ignorance, the victory of the Communist Party in Greece in the parliamentary elections, imagining that the party's victory was an indicator of a radical change in Greek policy toward the Middle East — as if the Greek people, very friendly to the Palestinian cause, groaning under the pressure of economic hardship and enormous debts, had the luxury of caring for other issues and forgetting its own issues pressing upon it.

The Turkish position — expected and very natural — and the Palestinian reaction to it stir important observations, namely:

• That the Palestinian cause and the blockade on Gaza are no longer among the priorities of international politics; the world is occupied with new issues, urgent and pressing, more than the Palestinian condition.

• That Palestinian political work and thinking mixes between the positions states can take and the Palestinian side's wishes of them.

• That the chronic condition of incapacity from which the Palestinian political system suffers pushes it to bet in a childish manner on the position of other states, as if awaiting relief and help from outside.

• That the Palestinian position, which rejoices much at the declarations issuing from states, takes them as if they were its own true position and political approach.

In the end, my opinion, which I wrote years ago, in summary:

• The Turkish–Israeli reconciliation can pour into the interest of the Palestinian situation, in application of a fundamental principle in politics: that friends are those who make concessions to one another, not enemies. So if Turkey desires to help Palestine through influencing Israeli policy toward Gaza and Palestine, it must enjoy a good relationship with Israel beforehand in order to be listened to.

• The Turkish position must represent a new incentive for the rationalisation of Palestinian political work toward more reason and less feeling. Millions of declarations, articles, and programmes supportive of the Palestinian cause are insufficient for reaching our goal if they are not accompanied by internal Palestinian work marked by rationality and professionalism, resting on strengthening the world's interests with us.

The solution: for the world to ally with us and support our positions, it must see its interest in that — and this is our responsibility, ours alone.