Completing the local elections in the Gaza Strip: the beginning of a way out of the impasse

Completing the local elections in the Gaza Strip: the beginning of the way out of the impasse

Omar Shaban

The current hard economic, social, and psychological conditions of the Gaza Strip cannot be understood except by seeing what it has suffered of blockade, division, and repeated wars since 2007, and by placing that within the course of internal political events — meetings and dialogues that led to no reconciliation, and understandings never implemented for holding the general elections for the Legislative Council, the presidency, and the National Council. With general elections impossible in the foreseeable term, and under the pressure of the successive crises battering the Gaza Strip, this paper proposes completing the local elections in the Gaza Strip. Local elections have been held three times since 2005 in the northern governorates without the Gaza Strip. The paper holds that local elections may offer a mechanism for a gradual exit from the impasse, and an available opportunity for change that would strengthen the local community's trust and its participation in administration and governance, strengthen contact and communication between the local municipalities and the world, and permit the attraction of projects to address the pressing environmental crises and problems in the Gaza Strip. The continuation of the status quo will bring only more harm upon the population, however hard Hamas labours to improve it; the movement has been damaged by appointing mayors, even where it made an effort to appoint the best to run the local authorities.

The Gaza Strip after fifteen years of division and blockade

The present situation in the Gaza Strip is marked by four principal indicators:

First — the closing of the political horizon and the loss of the Palestinian dream of change: the political division has paralysed the democratic process and split the Palestinian political system, and the division is likely to continue given the absence of reconciliation prospects from both parties' agendas and the failure of every international and regional effort to achieve it since the division began.

Second — the deterioration of the qualitative indicators: the Israeli blockade and the repeated wars have caused a sharp deterioration in every indicator of life in the Gaza Strip, including health, education, and the economy: 1.3 million of Gaza's 2.1 million Palestinians now need food aid[1], unemployment rose to 46.6% in the first quarter of 2022 against an average of 34.8% in 2006, while 81.4% of Palestinian families in the Gaza Strip live below the poverty line[2].

Third — the continuation of the rounds of escalation between the organisations in Gaza and the occupation: since 2007 the Gaza Strip has endured five major wars and dozens of short wars and military and security flare-ups, causing thousands of casualties from every stratum of society and the destruction of tens of thousands of homes and infrastructure facilities.

Fourth — psychological and social effects, and extremism: the division and the internal fighting contributed directly to splitting the political system, sidelining the democratic process, and denying the population their right to choose their representatives — producing frustration, despair, and horizonlessness among Gazans. It also drove the desire to emigrate among youth up to 37%[3], brought suicide attempts to further unprecedented levels, spread hate speech and incitement, and deepened the political and legal division between the Gaza Strip and the West Bank.

Moreover, the crushing living conditions, the spread of corruption within the political and economic classes, and the prevalence of vengeful tendencies have driven many young men toward extremist thought[4]. The Hamas leader Khalil al-Hayya said in 2015, in a session at the Legislative Council headquarters in Gaza: “our message to the whole world that fears terrorism and extremism is that delaying reconstruction and keeping the blockade on the Gaza Strip creates an environment fit for hatching extremism and increasing terrorism.”

Proceeding from the fact that the continuation of the economic and political situation as it stands has become impossible and crushing, a continuous threat to the people's unity and to the chances of economic growth and political development; with no prospect of completing the reconciliation; with both Egypt and the Palestinian Authority rejecting the option of a trade zone between Egypt and the Strip — since in their view it entrenches the Strip's separation from the West Bank and the Palestinian Authority; and with Israel placing severe restrictions on the type of goods entering Gaza, under the pretext of blocking “dual-use” goods, and on trade exchange with the West Bank and Israel — completing the municipal elections in the Gaza governorates may form a gateway to a gradual exit from the crisis.

Why elections?

Reasons calling for the local elections to be held:

Answering the legal obligation: holding local-authority elections fulfils what the law stipulates. Answering it is an opportunity for change and sustainable development after years of stoppage and division, an opportunity to break the ice and build, and a glimmer of hope for the young groups looking toward political and community participation.

Renewing legitimacies magnifies international connection: renewing the legitimacies of the local authorities, which depend heavily on international support, helps secure grants, projects, and aid — especially as the Gaza governorates suffer a great array of challenges in delivering services to the public, deteriorating infrastructure, and problems of environment, sanitation, and health.

Local-authority elections are a first step on the road to general elections: holding local-authority elections in the Gaza Strip is a genuine opportunity to persuade the international community to answer the Palestinians' desire for change, and presses the international community to work with the Israeli government toward holding the general elections.

Hamas's interest: holding local-authority elections at Hamas's initiative would show its belief in and support for the democratic course and the electoral process, especially as its previous positions favoured holding them. The movement's agreement and pursuit of completing the local elections in the Gaza Strip would strengthen its standing as a political movement seeking decision-making through the ballot box, improving its image before Palestinian society and the world — specifically the European Union, whose foreign-policy chief Josep Borrell said on 30 April 2021 that the postponement of the Palestinian elections, the first in 15 years, was “deeply disappointing”, adding that the EU consistently supports credible, inclusive, and transparent elections for all Palestinians[5]. Even if the results please no one entirely — especially should Hamas win — they will be acceptable to many. Hamas's direct or indirect participation in the local-authority elections in the West Bank places before it political and social obligations to hold them in the Gaza Strip.

Completing the municipal elections in the Gaza governorates

The Palestinian political system has never recorded elections held on their constitutional and legal dates — legislative, presidential, or local; they are postponed according to circumstances. In light of the Palestinian division a new factor was added: holding them in some governorates and not others. Since the division, the West Bank has seen three local elections. The first was in 2012; Hamas refused to take part and blocked their holding in the Strip, reasoning that local elections would “deepen the division and heighten tension”, while Fatah said that given the difficulty of holding comprehensive elections, the least that could be done was to go to local ones. In 2016 Hamas agreed to enter the local elections and permit them in the Gaza Strip — but those elections were not destined to succeed in the Strip: after challenges were filed against six Fatah lists, all of which the Elections Commission had accepted, the Commission received a ruling from the High Court of Justice in Ramallah to proceed with the elections in the West Bank and halt them in the Gaza Strip, “for the absence of a legitimate judiciary constituted according to the Basic Law and the relevant laws”.

A breakthrough came in 2021 after the meetings between the Central Elections Commission and the Palestinian factions in the West Bank and Gaza Strip: the factions, Hamas included, agreed to hold the general elections, and Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas issued decree No. (3) of 2021 on 15 January, setting the dates of the legislative, presidential, and National Council elections in three stages. Three months later, in April 2021, presidential decree No. (12) of 2021 was issued postponing the general elections; its first article read: “the general legislative and presidential and National Council elections are postponed… until the conditions for holding them are available across all the Palestinian territories, foremost among them Jerusalem the capital, according to the provisions of the law”.

Returning to the local elections: the Palestinian government approved in 2022 the holding of local elections in the West Bank, including Jerusalem, in two stages — but deferred them in Gaza because of the refusal of Hamas, which affirmed in a press statement on 13 March 2022 that fragmented elections entrench the approach of monopolisation and exclusion, and that there is no solution except comprehensive elections by national consensus^[6]. Hamas set three principal conditions for permitting local-authority elections in the Gaza Strip: first, that the local elections be part of the general elections — parliamentary and presidential included — and not a substitute for them; second, a written pledge from President Mahmoud Abbas guaranteeing the elections would not be cancelled at the last moment; and third, that the president retract the amendments he introduced to the local-elections law concerning the jurisdiction of the courts of first instance.

The motives for completing the elections in the Gaza Strip

Should the local-authority elections be completed in Gaza, they would deliver:

The right of participation: holding the local elections strengthens the chances of participation in the electoral process and the right “to stand and to vote”; restores dynamism to the Strip by setting all participants in motion; raises hope against the prevailing stagnation; pumps new blood into addressing the pressing issues and environmental problems in the local authorities; and moves citizens from talking of wars and destruction to talking of hope and the future.

Easing tension and spreading hope among youth: youth form about two-thirds of the Gaza Strip's population (2 million), and none of them has taken part in any election of any kind. The last local elections in the Gaza Strip were held in 2005. Denying young people participation in choosing their representatives is a violation of the constitution; it marginalises youth and makes them feel of little worth, driving some toward extremism and despair.

Completing the elections can be a small step toward comprehensive reconciliation: completing the local elections can only happen through coordination among all the relevant parties — the Palestinian government, the Central Elections Commission, and Hamas. It is a completing stage, not a new electoral round, and holding it requires the will and decision of all parties. Its completion would proceed under the laws governing the electoral process already held in the West Bank without the Gaza Strip; it must therefore enjoy the same specifications and procedures as any election held in Palestine under the laws in force. This development would strengthen contact and communication among the Palestinian movements — Hamas especially — with the Elections Commission, the Palestinian Authority, and Fatah. Coordinating the participation of the international community and civil society in the observation process would likewise confer legitimacy on these elections. And though optimism about reconciliation may be far from reality, holding the completing elections in the Gaza Strip is an important step that gives some confidence in the existence of a chance, however slim, on the road to the general elections: the success of the local elections would support trust-building between the two sides of the division, Fatah and Hamas, and would likely reopen the door of dialogue to address the problems of holding the general elections and the mechanisms of confronting them.

Local elections are about services before politics: local elections are not politicised like general elections; they are elections to renew legitimacies at the level of local administration, pumping in new blood, ideas, and programmes in the service of the local community. Their results are expected to be acceptable even if Hamas wins: the donors concerned with local communities deal with most of the municipalities in the Gaza Strip and with the mayors Hamas appointed. Several union and federation elections have been held with participation in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank — the latest the bar association's elections. All the party frameworks competed in the union elections, and internal and external parties accepted the legitimacy of those elections and their results. All this strengthens the chances of holding the local elections and lessens the fears over the international reaction whatever the results — for the international community that demands elections will not find it easy, in many of its quarters, to reject their results.

Stumbling blocks on the road to the elections

Hamas's fears: the chief challenge before holding the local-authority elections is Hamas's negative position on them despite its earlier agreement. According to the Central Elections Commission, Hamas requested “written” guarantees for permitting the local elections in the Gaza Strip concerning the laws organising them and a guarantee against postponement. The Commission added that Hamas's letter also raised matters concerning the elections law, specifically: “cancelling the formation of the elections-cases court, and returning jurisdiction over challenges to the courts of first instance in the West Bank and Gaza Strip”[7]. Amending the local-elections law will not be easy; it may be easier to secure Hamas's agreement to forming the elections court instead of making the amendment. In return, it may be wiser for all the competing parties, the Ministry of Local Government, and the Palestinian Authority to give guarantees of accepting the elections' results whatever their content. Effective local and international observation, able to strengthen the credibility of the electoral process and its results, will also be essential.

The administrative and technical procedures for holding the elections: questions and fears arise — even within Hamas itself — over the possibility of holding the elections according to the applicable laws. But the administrative and technical procedures of elections are merely mechanisms decision-makers set in order to reach the desired ends. When the elections enjoy the acceptance of all parties, the procedural and technical challenges can be addressed and overcome by consensus.

Conclusion

The paper holds that completing the local elections in the Gaza Strip is the completion of an electoral process that actually took place but was never finished. It is therefore not a separate electoral process but the completion of what was done; and success in it could make the Gaza Strip an interactive workshop on many levels, strengthening the economy and community communication, and could create a state of engagement, communication, dialogue, and constructive debate in place of the tension, hate speech, and despair prevailing today.

The paper also holds, on the basis of its survey of motives and difficulties, that holding the local elections is an achievable, applicable option — indeed it may form a small bridge toward Palestinian reconciliation. Completing the municipal elections strengthens the Gaza Strip's bond with the northern governorates and delivers a tangible interest for the Authority and the Palestinian presidency. These elections likewise serve Hamas by easing social tension, treating the phenomena of extremism and despair, lightening the burdens of running local government, and signalling that Hamas believes in pluralism — which would greatly help its gradual return to the Palestinian political order.

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[1] The Gaza Strip | The humanitarian impact of 15 years of blockade — June 2022, OCHA: https://bit.ly/3c8V9fe

[2] Report on poverty in the Gaza Strip, the Palestinian Centre for Human Rights: https://bit.ly/3pzqPNQ

[3] What future for the Gaza Strip in the coming five years, Omar Shaban, the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research, September 2021: https://bit.ly/3pEJjfW

[4] The repercussions of cancelling the local elections — by young researcher Ghassan al-Zaanin, research paper, Pal-Think for Strategic Studies — Gaza: https://bit.ly/3CrW5WM

[5] FRANCE24, The Palestinian elections: the European Union calls the postponement “disappointing” and Hamas denounces a “coup against partnership”, 30 April 2021: https://bit.ly/3MrZbvv

[6] Al-Resalah net (2022): Hamas: fragmented elections entrench the approach of monopolisation and exclusion, 13 March 2022: https://bit.ly/3uDek7g

[7] The exclusion of holding local elections in the Gaza Strip, Asharq al-Awsat, 4 January 2022: https://bit.ly/3pG0Jsg