A way out of the crisis: a proposal to establish a Gaza Reconstruction Council

Omar Shaban / Director of Pal-Think for Strategic Studies

Since the outbreak of the war in Gaza, debate over administering the Strip after the war has continued without arriving at a concrete, comprehensive plan. The people who remained in the Gaza Strip need immediate intervention to relieve their suffering and hasten the return of life to the Strip. The near-total destruction of the Strip, the enormous personal losses of life, the lack of accountability for Israel's actions, and the absence of a political horizon to end more than half a century of occupation that preceded 7 October create fertile ground for those who seek to ignite further violence and extremism, whether from within or from the region. A comprehensive plan for administering the Strip in the immediate post-war period is essential to secure enough stability to rebuild the Strip and prevent a return to fighting.
This proposal for administering Gaza immediately after the war rests on a set of assumptions: that the Palestinian people have the right to live a normal life in dignity and safety, and that they cannot and should not wait through a long period of consultation before those rights are realised; that Israel, and with it many states of the world, will not accept any political or governing role for Hamas on the day after; and, on the other hand, since Hamas has not given its blessing for the newly appointed Palestinian government to work fully in Gaza, it will likely not allow it to operate freely there.
 In addition, it would be unrealistic and very dangerous to attempt to restore public safety or launch any reconstruction process without adequate coordination and cooperation with the remaining employees of the de facto authority in Gaza — that is, Hamas, which has been the governing body in Gaza since 2007.
Rebuilding Gaza will require engaging the civil servants of the former de facto authority side by side with the Palestinian Authority's employees in the Gaza Strip. The PA's employees are not sufficient; some have left the Strip or retired, and many have not practised their work since 2007. There are additionally 5,000 municipal employees in Gaza. Before 7 October, the government sector in the Gaza Strip comprised about 24,000 civil servants, especially in education and health, plus 18,000 police. When Hamas was elected in 2007, many PA employees in Gaza were dismissed, while many continued working under the Hamas administration, especially in health and education. Their number is estimated at about 25,000 — 15,000 civilian employees and 10,000 security personnel. Some need retraining and reorientation. Engaging the civil servants of the former de facto authority is therefore essential to start the civil-administration process, alongside the return of the PA employees who have stayed at home without work. This plan assumes integrating the PA's employees into the government sector together with the employees of the Gaza government. Leaving any of them out is not an option if public order is to be strengthened and results achieved. In light of these facts, the plan consists of four integrated elements:
The first element: establishing a Gaza Reconstruction Council. The council would comprise 15 to 20 people, mostly PA employees living in Gaza whose salaries are paid by the PA in Ramallah. The council would coordinate its work with the international organisations that will work on rebuilding the Gaza Strip. It must be stressed that this committee would act as the Gaza branch of the Palestinian government and coordinate fully with it. Its members must be allowed routine, easy travel to Ramallah and back, and meetings with the PA president and the prime minister. The committee must also declare it will work with the civil servants of the de facto authority — essential for winning the cooperation and support of the political and community forces in the Gaza Strip. The Gaza Reconstruction Council must declare clearly that its mandate carries no political responsibilities, that it is a temporary body of no more than two years, and that its responsibility is confined to planning, launching, and managing the early-recovery and reconstruction process. The council must coordinate its work, funding, and plan with the local and international community; a website must be created to publicise its work regularly to the public and donors. A dedicated bank account must be opened so reconstruction funds are separated from any other purposes, under local-international supervision. The Palestinian diaspora must also be engaged in this effort, since many hold the essential technical knowledge and the resources needed to stimulate investment in Gaza's future. Seats on the council should include representatives from the Gaza Strip for the following sectors:
* The water sector
* The electricity and energy sector
* The Ministry of Health
* The Ministry of Social Affairs
* The Ministry of Local Government
* The Ministry of Agriculture
* The Ministry of Housing and Public Works
* The contractors' union
* The businessmen's association
* 3 members from civil society, mostly women
* The chief of the local police
* Observers and liaison from the international organisations, including: UNRWA, the World Food Programme, the World Health Organization, the International Committee of the Red Cross, and Palestinian NGOs.
The second element: establishing a local police force to enforce the law and preserve security and civil peace. The force would number 5,000 — 2,500 from the PA security forces who continued living in Gaza, and 2,500 from the remaining personnel of the de facto authority in Gaza. A Palestinian police chief would be appointed from among those residing in Egypt or Ramallah, and 20–25 senior police professionals from Egypt, Jordan, and Morocco would be invited to come to Gaza to supervise, train, and mentor the newly formed police force. The police chief would hold a seat on the Gaza Reconstruction Council.
The third element: monitoring and managing Gaza's crossings. The European Union and the United States should be invited to cooperate with the PA's crossings administration in taking responsibility for monitoring and supervising the flow of materials, in coordination with the Israeli side, alongside local staff from the various relevant PA ministries in Gaza. This requires lifting the blockade on the entry of raw materials and needed equipment. The Rafah crossing must be opened permanently to allow the return of the many qualified and technical people who left Gaza during the war. There can be no reconstruction in Gaza without them.
The fourth and especially important element: strengthening civil society in Gaza. A dedicated fund should be created by donor states to help Gaza's civil society rebuild their offices, property, equipment, and other infrastructure. The fund should support programmes treating the psychological and social scars the war has caused, and fostering a culture of tolerance, the rejection of violence, coexistence, civil peace, and the rebuilding of the social fabric. This includes helping Gaza's universities and education sector, destroyed by the war, to rebuild their programmes.
There are of course several conditions necessary for this proposal to be implemented successfully. First, the United States, the Palestinian Authority, Israel, the European Union, and the relevant Arab states — especially Egypt — must agree to the plan. Second, the council must enjoy the support and backing of all political forces in the Gaza Strip. Third, the council must declare that it is a temporary technical-administrative body, replacing no other governing body and holding no political agenda beyond rebuilding Gaza. Finally, the international community — principally the United States, the European Union, and the major Arab states — must make substantial financial pledges to the reconstruction projects and to budget support for the activities the council coordinates.
This is a broad plan requiring detailed plans to be prepared by the council in coordination with the PA's plans and with the organisations working in international finance. The participation of local private-sector companies, those harmed by the war, and the municipal-government sector in planning, implementation, and oversight must be maximised so that the reconstruction process enjoys community protection and support.
An international reconstruction conference should be organised, with the wealthy states and international institutions taking part, to secure the funding needed to launch reconstruction at a scale that gives the citizens of the Gaza Strip who endured the war's horrors hope of a better future. Dozens of competent and experienced Palestinians of the diaspora — especially those who left the Strip because of the war — should be encouraged to return and contribute to the reconstruction.
The political challenges to implementing this proposal are great, but the leaders and the political and community forces must show the vision and the courage needed to face and overcome them if we are to avoid a repetition of this nightmare.