Must the Palestinians recognise Israel as a Jewish state?

Translated by Jihad Abu Salim – Pal-Think for Strategic Studies

Hussein Ibish* – Foreign Policy website
25 May 2011

Most observers believed that the Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu would direct the harshest criticism at the Palestinians because of the reconciliation between the Fatah and Hamas movements during his visit to the United States. Surprisingly, his high-profile remarks turned into a demand that the Palestinians recognise Israel as a “Jewish state”. To be sure, Netanyahu exploited every opportunity to condemn the Palestinian unity agreement, comparing Hamas with al-Qaeda and referring to the praise of Osama bin Laden by some Hamas leaders. But his most pointed, emotional and repeated theme was that the basis of the conflict and the important key to its solution is the Palestinians' refusal to recognise Israel as a “Jewish state”.
Netanyahu said before Congress, “The time has come for President Abbas to stand before his people and say .. I will accept the Jewish state; these six words will change history”.
The majority leader in the House of Representatives, Eric Cantor, affirmed Netanyahu's words, claiming that “the refusal of the Palestinians and the Arab world to recognise Israel's right to exist as a Jewish state is the root of the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians. The issue is not about the '67 lines”. Washington echoed the voices of the Israeli politicians and their supporters, insisting that the conflict does not revolve around territory or Palestinian independence, but on the contrary revolves around the issue of the Jewish state.

The idea centred on the necessity of the Palestinians formally recognising the Jewish character of Israel is a relatively new idea. In fact, it does not predate the Annapolis conference of 2007, where this idea was raised briefly by the Israeli delegation. Back at that time, the Palestinians rejected this idea on the grounds that it was a diversion irrelevant to the final-status issues such as borders, security, Jerusalem and refugees. Even the administration of George W. Bush was not enamoured of this idea, and in his speech to the conference President Bush simply referred to Israel as a “national homeland for the Jewish people.”

The historic demand of the Palestinians was, in the words of United Nations Security Council resolution 242, to recognise “Israel's right to live in peace within secure and recognised boundaries free from threats and acts of force.” The issue of the Jewish state was not raised during Israel's negotiations with Egypt and Jordan. The Palestine Liberation Organisation formally recognised Israel in the letters of mutual recognition in 1993, which were the foundations of the Oslo process and all the negotiations that flowed from it, while in return Israel simply recognised the PLO as the legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. After that the PLO went through an arduous series of amendments affecting its basic documents. The Palestinians at that point fully satisfied all the diplomatic and legal requirements concerning recognition of Israel, and waited in vain for Israeli recognition of an independent Palestinian state in return.
After his election in 2009, Netanyahu made this demand a fundamental pillar. In fact, he and his supporters now say that this demand is not only important, but is the real issue, even though this issue was not raised during most of the Palestinian–Israeli negotiations, even during his first term as prime minister.
The idea that a state – or in this case a potential state – should take part in defining the national character of another state is highly unusual in international relations, if not rare. The Palestinian position, as expressed by President Mahmoud Abbas, is that the PLO recognises Israel, and that Israel is free to define itself in whatever way it chooses.
There are several decisive concerns that make it very difficult for the Palestinians to accept this demand, and particularly to accept it as a precondition for further negotiations.

Quite apart from the Palestinians' strong feeling that they have carried out all the reasonable demands that could be imposed on them regarding recognition of Israel without a reciprocal recognition of a future Palestinian state, the Palestinian leaders are worried about the ways in which this could prejudice some of the final-status issues, principally the issue of the Palestinian refugees. The Palestinian leaders are well aware that a wide-ranging implementation of the refugees' right of return to Israel is doomed to failure from the Israeli point of view. It is also, however, the most challenging political issue that any Palestinian leadership would have to sell to voters in order to win support for an agreement ending the conflict, for the return of the refugees is clearly established in international legitimacy and is one of the most important Palestinian national issues. It is one of the few main cards remaining for the Palestinians to play, and while it is reasonable to urge the Palestinians to work harder to prepare the street for the concessions required, it is not reasonable to ask them to accept any compromise before a general and final agreement is concluded.

And while the Palestinians clearly accept the logic of the two-state solution, and have always acknowledged that a final-status agreement will include an end of claims between the parties, they reasonably feel that being asked to agree to language to the effect that Israel is a state of Jewish character may prejudice the Palestinians' chance of obtaining other things should they accept a settlement of the issue of the refugees and their return. The majority of serious observers have long realised that the issue of Jerusalem is a similar problem for the Israeli side, and that no matter whether the Israeli leaders and their public like it or not, no Palestinian leadership will accept an agreement that does not place the Palestinian capital in Jerusalem. The refugee issue therefore represents the best leverage, if not the only one, that would make the Israelis concede painfully with regard to the future of Jerusalem.

In addition, the Palestinians are worried that recognising Israel as a Jewish state would endorse racial discrimination against the Palestinian minority in Israel, which represents 20 per cent of the population. The Palestinians point out that Israeli Jews do not agree about what the Jewish character of Israel is and means. Important sections of Israeli law, life and society have been constructed in a discriminatory manner based on nationality (such as “Jew”, “Arab”, and dozens of classifications created by the state), and this contradicts the concept of citizenship. This discrimination applies to housing, education, military service and many other benefits, access to state-owned land, and other important aspects of social and economic life. It is understandable that the Palestinians are uncomfortable with anything that would force them to submit to these discriminatory structures that permeate Israeli society in favour of those classified by the state as “Jews”.

For decades the Palestinians have been told to recognise Israel and renounce violence, and through their sole legitimate international representative, the PLO, they did so twenty years ago, even though that meant renouncing their right to 78% of the country in which they were a majority in 1948. The Palestinians did this on their understanding that it would lead, in a short period, to their independence on a small part of what they consider their state, based on historical documents beyond reproach. This has not materialised and has not appeared imminent; and now the Palestinians are being informed that what they did was not enough, and that this narrative concept — that is, recognition of Israel's Jewishness — is now the central issue, and that they must read from the script given to them by the Israeli leaderships, and that if they say that magic word the problem will be solved.

I doubt there is a single Palestinian who does not believe that behind Netanyahu's demand lies a fundamental aversion with regard to accepting a genuine and sovereign independent Palestinian state. In fact, in the Knesset on the sixteenth of May and in Congress on the twenty-fourth of May, Netanyahu insisted on a long-term Israeli military presence along the Jordan River — in other words, he denies potential Palestinian control over its own borders. This statement placed Netanyahu squarely at odds with President Obama's clear reference to a “full and phased Israeli withdrawal” from the areas that will become a Palestinian state; add to that his harsh and unserious position that he is not prepared to negotiate seriously about Jerusalem. Netanyahu's insistence that the real issue for Abbas is to chant the incantation “I accept Israel as a Jewish state” is therefore an exceptionally hollow demand.

Netanyahu's demand is a complicated demand added to an already complicated web, but this demand has sunk deep into the consciousness of the Israelis and their supporters, such that some kind of language that would satisfy this consciousness must eventually be found. Mutual recognition of the Jewish right to self-determination in Israel and the Palestinian right to self-determination in Palestine may well prove a precondition on which the peace process can flourish. But to expect the Palestinians, without anything in return, to embellish their recognition of Israel with a problematic, premature and, at this stage, politically impossible declaration recognising Israel as a “Jewish state” (whatever meaning these words carry) can be interpreted as another obstacle, without justification, standing in the way of peace.

* Hussein Ibish is a research fellow at the American Task Force on Palestine.

Hussein Ibish is senior research fellow at the American Task Force on Palestine. He blogs at www.ibishblog.com.