The United States may be heading towards talking to Hamas

Zvi Bar'el* – Haaretz
Translated by/ Jihad Abu Salim – Pal-Think for Strategic Studies

How would Israel respond if a senior American official announced that the United States was ready to talk with the leadership of Hamas?
There is no cause for worry as yet. The United States still maintains its policy of not talking with Hamas, but last week the United States ended the ban on talking with the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. From this point on, there will be no need for meetings in the dark. Official American representatives can talk with any member of the Brotherhood. Washington has not acted prematurely. The Egyptian army and the Egyptian interim government, in addition to the majority of the presidential candidates in Egypt, view the Brotherhood as an integral part of society and politics in Egypt. And the announcement by one of its leaders, Abdel Moneim Aboul Fotouh, of his intention to stand for the presidency was not seen as an unusual step in Egypt.

“There will be no free and fair elections in Egypt unless we agree to talk with the people who are part of the democracy,” said Edward Ned Walker, the former American ambassador to both the United States and Israel. And while Israel is preoccupied with the Freedom Flotilla and prepares to declare war on a few hundred citizens of the world who want to challenge its “sovereignty” over Gaza, Washington has suddenly decided to follow a realistic diplomacy.

A decision of this kind should not come as a surprise. The American administration, which entered into dialogue with the Taliban in Afghanistan, which entered into political discussion with the terrorist organisations in Iraq, and which cooperates with the Lebanese government that includes members of Hezbollah, does not need to invent excuses when it holds meetings with the Islamic movement that forms part of Egyptian politics, even if this movement's ideology is radical.

Those warning about the issue of America's dialogue with the Brotherhood are looking for a “tsunami” and will make America's dialogue with the Muslim Brotherhood the first wave of this tsunami. The reason for this is that the Muslim Brotherhood is the parent organisation of Hamas, and the next question that will be raised is why the United States should not talk with Hamas. After all, Hamas is an integral part of Palestinian politics and society, it also won a large majority in the elections, and now, after its reconciliation with Fatah, Hamas will go to the Palestinian parliamentary elections. The official excuse for the policy of not holding dialogue with Hamas lies behind Hamas's failure to denounce terrorism as a means of achieving political goals, and its non-recognition of the state of Israel – neither as a Jewish state nor as any state. At first glance these pretexts and excuses seem convincing, but the Muslim Brotherhood does not practise terrorism, while at the same time the Brotherhood does not regard the Palestinian armed struggle as terrorism; on the contrary, the Muslim Brotherhood sees armed struggle as a liberation struggle against occupation. And if terrorism is the criterion, how can Washington justify its cooperation with the Lebanese government that includes Hezbollah, the group placed by the United States on the terrorism list?

These contradictions in American foreign policy are not the important point in themselves. Rather, the essence of the matter is the way in which Washington draws its new map of enemies and friends. In short, the United States is not drawing the map. In truth, it is the developments in the Arab world that are convincing Washington to reconsider its regional policy. The things that have happened in Egypt, in the cities of Syria and in Bahrain do not stem from previously planned American policies; but there are places that make American policy reshape itself, and those who advocate this policy will be compelled to reconsider their positions on the Palestinian–Israeli conflict. Washington is not redefining friends and enemies for itself alone; its foreign-policy positions later become a road map for other countries of the world.
The threat posed before Israel must engage with these facts. Suddenly, it has become clearer to the American administration that Mahmoud Abbas will not retreat under pressure from resorting to the United Nations in order to obtain recognition of the state. It has become evident that the internal Palestinian reconciliation agreement was signed despite American opposition, and that Hamas will be a cornerstone of any diplomatic process. What will Washington do when the Palestinian elections are held? Should it boycott the Palestinian Legislative Council and the Palestinian government? Should it ignore the new Palestinian president if he belongs to Hamas? After all, Hamas is “part of the democracy”.

Perhaps America will try to pre-empt the diplomatic catastrophe and move towards talking with Hamas before the elections so that it will be able to conduct a dialogue with the organisation after the elections? It is likely that the Gaza flotilla will constitute a pleasant sea voyage compared with the American fleet that has landed in Egypt. But why be troubled by this political movement now, so long as we are able to spend the time thinking about the Gaza (Freedom) flotilla?

*Zvi Bar'el is an analyst of Middle East affairs at the Hebrew newspaper Haaretz.
http://www.haaretz.com/print-edition/opinion/the-u-s-may-be-heading-toward-talks-with-hamas-1.370965